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Abstract
This paper reviews the performance of the East German economy in
the turbulent quarter-century following reunication and draws some
conclusions for the reunication of North and South Korea. In this
period, the gap in output per capita between East and West Germany
declined at a speed not far from empirical estimates of the neoclas-
sical growth model, yet systematic total factor productivity di¤eren-
tials persist despite identical institutional frameworks and signicant
investment in the eastern regions. At the same time, regional dispar-
ities in income, well-being, and health are little di¤erent from those
found within West Germany, and net migration has ceased. On this
human metric, German unication has been an unqualied success.
For Korea, an e¤ort of this dimension will be costly. A back-of-the-
envelope calculation suggests that Korean unication will cost roughly
twice as much as its German counterpart.
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1 Introduction
On November 9, 1989, the East German government opened the Berlin Wall
and allowed its citizens to travel freely across a border which had been closed
for 28 years. In doing so, the government of the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) set the stage for its own demise and the replacement of communism
with a capitalist economic system. On July 1, 1990, the GDR adopted a
regime of free trade in goods and services, free ow of labor capital and
ideas, as well as the economic and social framework that had existed in the
Federal Republic of Germany since the end of World War II. Political union
was sealed on October 3 of the same year.
The state of the East German economy in 1990 was nothing short of
catastrophic. Amplied by cumulative migration of millions of its citizens to
the West, disparities in economic development between the two Germanies
were enormous. After forty years of separation from the Federal Repub-
lic, Eastern German per capita income stood at about one-third of Western
levels. What has happened in the meantime? Are those developments con-
sistent with received economic theory and evidence? Can German unication
inform policy regarding feasible paths of a future unied Korea?
This paper reviews the evolution of the East German economy in the tur-
bulent and remarkable quarter-century following reunication, and does so
with an eye to the potential unication of North and South Korea, which by
all accounts is a much larger project. Despite an initial surge in productivity,
unprecedented structural change, deep trade integration, and record levels of
capital inows and outmigration, East-West di¤erences in output per capita
have declined over the entire period at a speed not far from that predicted
by the benchmark neoclassical growth model with a large share of national
income accruing to capital. Yet convergence was far from uniform, with most
coming in the rst ten years; despite commonly shared rule of law, identical
institutional frameworks and massive investment activity in the eastern re-
gions, a signicant East-West productivity gap continues to persist. At the
same time, Eastern levels of consumption per capita, well-being, unemploy-
ment rates and health are little di¤erent from those across West Germany.
On this human metric, German unication has been an unqualied, albeit
expensive success. Judging from that experience, Korean unication is likely
to be a very expensive proposition.
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2 Initial conditions and progress
We begin by reviewing the initial situation as well as the overall evolution of
the East German economy since the fall of the wall. Formal political reuni-
cation took place in October 1990, but reliable national income and product
account data for Eastern Germany are unavailable before 1991. While once
considered by the US Central Intelligence Agency to be the Eastern Blocs
economic powerhouse, East Germanys GDP was revealed at unication to
be signicantly below that of the West.1 This case was made convincingly by
Akerlof et al. (1991), who obtained the top-secret "Valuta-prices" used by
the GDR trade ministry to estimate the value of exports priced in Ostmark
necessary to generate oneWest German mark at a ctional exchange rate par-
ity (which was ultimately adopted in July 1990). Akerlof and his colleagues
estimated that 80% of industrial output was uncompetitive when valued at
world prices, and within a year, the economic backwardness of the GDR was
plain to see - physical production had collapsed by more than 50% and job-
lessness in the new states had risen from zero to well over 20%, if short-time
working is included (Akerlof et al. 1991). The gale forces of competition and
consumer sovereignty devastated East Germanys industrial landscape, while
o¤ering opportunities in services sectors ranging from retail and wholesale
trade, logistics, and business services to restaurants, entertainment and other
personal services.
Figure 1 displays per capita GDPs for all 16 Bundesländer (federal states)
in 1991.2 Most striking is the distinctive disparity between the GDPs of the
Western Länder and those of the ve new ones from the East: Brandenburg,
Saxony, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia.
Unied Berlin most vividly illustrates the burden of unication - while large
cities normally boast productivity twice the national average, Berlins was
around 90%. Overall, the gap between the Eastern states and the least pro-
ductive in the West  Schleswig-Holstein  amounts to a factor of about
three roughly comparable to the GDP gap between Mexico and the United
States. We focus initially on GDP rather than income because scal policy
can always break the link between the two. From the beginning, the new
states received enormous support in the form of governmental transfers, esti-
mated cumulatively to be more than e 2 trillion. These transfers took many
forms: direct subsidies to local and state governments, investment nancing,
but most importantly, the propping up of social funds in the years imme-
1Absurd as it may seem, the CIA Factbook of 1987 estimated GNP per capita at
$10,400 per capita in 1985 compared with $10,300 per capita for West Germany!
2We use data from the Federal Statistical O¢ ce collected in cooperation with the federal
states. See the Appendix for the exact sources.
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Figure 1: Per capita GDP. German states, 1991
diately following unication, including retirement benets, health insurance,
disability payments, unemployment benets, and short-time work. Because
East Germans were unable to nance their share of social union, West Ger-
mans picked up the tab via a "solidarity surcharge" on income taxes and,
more importantly, increases in social contribution rates paid by all German
workers.3
In the course of the past 25 years of economic transformation - best
described as a mix of structural change, technological upgrading, inward
capital mobility and outward migration - the gap in income between East
and West shrank signicantly, as shown in Figure 2. In particular, while per
capita GDP of the new Bundesländer is still well below those that of Bavaria
and Baden-Württemberg, it no longer lags signicantly behind that of the
poorer states in the West (Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony). A North-
South divide is gradually emerging as the lasting feature of East Germany
economic geography, just as in the Western part of the country.
Is this convergence process in line with the predictions of neoclassical
growth theory? Or did the West-East transfers as well as the seamless inte-
3Social insurance in Germany is nanced in typical Bismarkian fashion by worker and
employee contributions, i.e. the wage bill. In the period from 1990 to 1997, the overall
social security burden (social contributions to all social funds paid by workers and rms
as a fraction of the wage bill) rose from just under 30% to 36.3%.
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Figure 2: Per capita GDP, German states, 2015
gration of capitalist institutions generate an especially strong speed of eco-
nomic convergence? In the next section, we examine German data using
central predictions of neoclassical growth theory.
3 East Germany through the lens of Solow
(1956) and Swan (1956)
Many mechanisms drive economic integration - trade in goods and services,
capital mobility, labor mobility, transfer of technology and the adoption of
economic institutions. In the German unication episode, the most conspic-
uous force was a massive surge in private and public investment activity in
the East. In the years 1991-2013 more than e2 trillion was spent on gross
capital formation, a number which roughly matches the estimated volume
of transfers from the West. About a third of this was in equipment, about
two-thirds in structures, and tax subsidies played a large role in steering
investment patterns (Sinn 1991, 2002). Despite excessive investment in res-
idential housing at the expense of plant and equipment, average investment
rates overall in the new states averaged 29%, signicantly higher than 20% in
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the West.4 Within a few years of unication, per capita consumption jumped
to about 2/3 of West German levels even as restructuring was ubiquitous and
output stagnated, so new investment was funded by current account decits.
While we will later invoke central insights of Ramsey (1928) when con-
sidering the integration of Eastern Germany, it is most natural to think in
terms of the Solow-Swan growth model with its emphasis on physical capi-
tal accumulation and its centerpiece, the neoclassical aggregate production
function.5 The Solow-Swan model provides a useful framework for looking at
proximate sources of economic growth and the theory features several falsi-
able implications. We concentrate on the role of investment and migration
in growth as well as the issue of economic convergence, that is, if per-capita
income will equalize across regions over time. In particular, we ask (i) if there
exists a positive relationship between output growth and the investment rate
and (ii) if the growth rate of output per capita is negatively related to the
initial levels.6
3.1 Investment rates and economic growth
One of the key predictions of the Solow-Swan model is that economic devel-
opment is closely associated with the accumulation of physical capital (which,
given the models closed-economy setup, corresponds to savings). We start
by discussing the impact of di¤erent investment patterns across the German
Länder and ask if high investment manifested itself in higher rates of eco-
nomic growth. We measure for each state the investment rate as the average
of the 1991-2015 investment to GDP ratios and economic growth rates (as
in per capita GDP). Figure 3 shows a clear positive relationship between
the individual investment rates as well as growth rates: those Länder that
exhibited the fastest growth over the last 25 years were typically those that
have had a relatively high rate of capital accumulation. This ts well what is
suggested by the Solow-Swan model. In fact, the states that grew the fastest
were located in the East and capital formation is evidently one central reason
for their faster rate of development over the last twenty-ve years.
4Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, VGR der Länder Reihe 1 Band 3.
5Solow (1956) and Swan (1956).
6Labor mobility is another important source of economic growth. Following Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (2004), we examine below the role of migration in the convergence process.
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Figure 3: Growth and Investment in the German states
3.2 Convergence
Of great signicance in the public policy debate was the speed and timing
of convergence, i.e. how many years would it require for standards of living
of both parts of Germany to become indistinguishable in an economic sense.
Chancellor Kohls now famous promise of blühende Landschaften (blossoming
landscapes) in the new states was a key slogan in political campaigns of the
early 1990s. In fact, income convergence in Germany was subject of the
academic debate from the very beginning. Barro (1991) suggested that it
would take a signicant amount of time until a roughly equal standard of
living is reached. He stated that the East will "[...] eventually catch up to
the West, but in a couple of generations rather than a couple of years or a
couple of decades.[Barro, 1991].
Barros claim followed directly from empirical evidence: a negative rela-
tionship between the growth rate of per capita output and the initial output
per capita (measured as the distance from the steady state). The relation-
ship was established empirically by Baumol (1986), Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1992) and others when looking across countries as well as regions, and Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1995) derive a quantitative prediction for a log-linearized
Solow-Swan economy close to its steady state growth path. In cross-country
analyses, variation in savings rates, population growth, technical progress
and other parameters will lead countries to converge to di¤erent steady states
of economic development. In principle, this conditional convergence should
7
Figure 4: Convergence
be less important in Germany, where agents and rms share the same gov-
ernment, institutions and preferences. We thus begin by assuming that all
German regions converge to the same steady state and test for absolute con-
vergence. Even though the neoclassical growth model often predicts local
convergence rates of 4% or more, Barro and Sala-i-Martins (1991, 2004)
consistently nd convergence speeds in the vicinity of 2% per annum for
U.S. states, European regions, and Japanese prefectures.7 Given enormous
nancial transfers involved as well as the relatively seamless adoption of func-
tioning institutions, was the speed of convergence of the new German states
signicantly di¤erent from that predicted by the empirical work of Barro and
Sala-i-Martin?
To investigate this question, we run the following univariate regression





ln yi;1991 + ui:
In this regression, gyi;2015=yi;1991 is the average annual rate of growth of each
of the Bundesländer, yi;1991 denotes the 1991 real per capita GDP of Bun-
7Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) show that in the Solow/Swan model near its steady
state y*, d ln y=dt =   ln(y=y), where  = (1 )(a+ + n);  is the capital elasticity
of production, a is the rate of technical progress,  is the rate of capital depreciation,
and n is the rate of population growth. To obtain an empirical value of  in the range
of 0.02, a much higher capital share is necessary. They argue this may be the case if a
large component of wages actually reects a return to an accumulable factor, i.e. human
capital.
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desland i, adjusted by population, the parameter  stands for the speed of
the convergence process. Lastly, c is a constant and we set T = 24, reecting
time frame of available data. The estimated  coe¢ cient of 0:016 (R
2
= 0:88)
is conrmed by Figure 4s plot of the average growth rates and the initial
values of per capita GDP. The implied half-life to close the initial gap is
t = ln 2= = 0:69=0:016  40 years. The estimate is comparable to those
reported by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 2004) for US states. In fact,
in the longest sample (1880-2000), they report an estimate for  of 0.016,
suggesting that the overall convergence speed of the German Bundesländer
since 1991 is slightly below the 2% rule, although thoroughly consistent with
Barros prediction in 1991.
To shed further light on this question, we re-run the same convergence
regression on the two subperiods 1991-2001 and 2002-2015. The results are
now strikingly di¤erent, however: The coe¢ cient  for the rst decade af-
ter unication is estimated at 0.0454, indicating convergence signicantly in
excess of the 2% rule. In the second subsample, the estimated convergence
coe¢ cient is only 0.0093 or less than 1%. Rather than conventional uncon-
ditional convergence, we see a more plausible account of the past twenty-ve
years as a very rapid convergence to a common, lower conditional steady state
productivity level followed by little or no improvement in the aftermath. To
support this claim below, we adduce evidence on persistently lower total fac-
tor productivity in eastern German states. Applied to the Korean context,
this implies low-hanging fruit in the initial stages of a reunication in terms
of rapid productivity gains, followed by a long hangover of disappointing
progress. The di¢ cult part will be to identify the conditional steady state of
North Korea with any degree of accuracy, given that it depends on a host of
largely unknown factors.
3.3 The contribution of migration
The original papers by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) studied closed economies.
In that context, deferred consumption rather than capital mobility is the pri-
mary mechanism driving convergence. It is even more striking that despite
massive capital mobility, convergence did not occur at any faster rate than
the 2% rule. Yet capital mobility is not the only alternative mechanism of
convergence. While free trade between East and West in a common currency
(the Deutsche Mark) ensured a convergence of output prices, the opening of
the wall was followed by mass migration of more than one million persons.
Such population movements, involving mostly persons of working age, are
likely to have had an e¤ect on the evolution of GDP per capita, wages, and
unemployment. Burda and Hunt (2001) and Hunt (2006) study this ques-
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tion and nd that wage di¤erentials between east and west Länder played a
central role in shaping migration patterns. They also nd that the wage pull
was asymmetric and strongest for young people, just as theory predicts.
After the fall of the Wall, formerly communist companies and factories
in the East were suddenly thrust into competition with signicantly more
e¢ cient western enterprises. Many eastern regions never recovered from the
shock and even over 25 years after reunication, unemployment in the former
East Germany hovers at above 7-8% compared with 5-6% or less in the
West German states. However, as economic development took on asymmetric
patterns, people decided to move: the population of the East (excluding
Berlin) declined from 14.6 million in 1991 to 12.7 million, while the West
German population increased by about 5 million.
In the following, we take up this question, following the lead of Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (2004) and examine empirical determinants of migration among
the Länder. Labor movements is proxied by net migration into Bundesland
i at time t, mi;t, reect di¤erence in present and future income, proxied by
the former, per capita income, yi;t; and Bundesland population density, di,
which proxies for e¤ects related to urbanization, externalities etc. and its






















Consistent with Burda and Hunt (2001) and Hunt (2006), we nd that migra-
tion is strongly inuenced by GDP di¤erentials. The value for intra-German
mobility is higher than what Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) nd for the US
and Japan (over longer period, they also adjust for geography - heating days
- but that seems to be irrelevant for a small country like Germany where the
weather much less across the country).
3.4 The initial jump in productivity: What was it?
Although the overall convergence rate appears in line with the Barro/Sala-i-
Martins 2% rule, convergence in the new German states is largely driven by
a quantum jump in growth in the rst ve years following reunication. This
high rate of growth was associated with an investment boom, especially in
housing, and may have distorted the economy as it entered the rst decades
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of the 21st century. But it was also driven by signicant restructuring and
unemployment at the time (Burda and Funke 1995).
As we have seen, the speed of convergence decreased dramatically after
a roaring 1990s period. The migration process no doubt played a signicant
part in this decline, as a signicant component of productivity convergence
occurs via the denominator, i.e. movement of people. That convergence has
ground to a halt since 2000 suggests that conditional convergence may be
the more appropriate perspective for studying the integration of the two re-
gions of Germany: Despite common rule of law, near-identical institutional
frameworks and enormous investment activity in the eastern regions, signi-
cant regional productivity di¤erentials persist that appear due to underlying
di¤erences in production conditions. In the next session we explore these
di¤erences in more detail.
4 East Germany through the lens of Solow
(1957)
Solow (1957) demonstrated the decisive importance of technological change,
or generalized economic e¢ ciency, for economic development. We thus con-
tinue our study of East Germany from the perspective of neoclassical growth
theory by examining productivity levels across Germany. In particular, we
ask: how di¤erent is total factor productivity across the Länder and are those
di¤erences correlated with output per capita?
In particular, we will consider the "development accounting" decomposi-
tion following Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005), and assume that each





1  0 <  < 1
where Yi;t denotes output,Ki;t stands for the aggregate physical capital stock,
and Li;t is labor input.8 We allow the Bundesländer to have di¤erent states
of technology. This is captured in the variable Ai;t which stands for labor-
augmenting total factor productivity. As we do not adjust for human capital,
Ai;t embodies a liberal interpretation of technology which includes education
and training as well as infrastructure, rule of law, and social capital. We set
the capital elasticity  = 0:36. We use this aggregate production function to
8For a similar analysis see Severgnini (2010) and Burda and Severgnini (forthcoming).
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Figure 5: Total factor productivity (TFP) and GDP levels











For this exercise, we require data on regional aggregate outputs as well as
factor inputs in some particular year. The capital stocks were constructed
by Burda and Severgnini (2015) extending data of the Federal Statistical
O¢ ce and labor input is measured as total hours worked.9 Figure 5 plots
levels of total factor productivity as well as outputs per employee in 2011.
The clear pattern is that the less productive states have signicantly lower
levels of total factor productivity. Figure 6 graphs total factor productivities
for 2000 as well as 2011 and shows that productivity di¤erentials across the
Bundesländer are persistent over time.
To investigate the importance of productivity di¤erentials in explaining
East-West labor productivity di¤erences, we construct the following coun-
terfactual: what would be the output of an East German state if it could
produce using the best possible TFP? Concretely, given the data series of cap-
ital and labor input employed in each state, we compute GDP Y pi;t implied if
each Land were to have access to the level TFP of Baden-Württemberg (the
9Currently available data on total hours worked covers the years from 2000 to 2011
which is the reason for our timing choice. Furthermore, we combine Berlin and Branden-
burg, taking into account the large number of commuters between the two states.
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Figure 6: Persistence of TFP
non-city Land with the highest value) denoted by ABW;t, as




Figure 7 compares actual and counterfactual per capita GDPs for several
states. The gap between the two represents the contribution of di¤erent
TFP levels. Consider Saxony, which despite thriving new industrial devel-
opments in the Dresden region (including Volkswagen, Bombardier etc.) re-
mains one of the least productive states; its GDP per capita in 2011 was
roughly 65 % that of Baden-Württemberg in 2015. If Saxony had access to
Baden-Württembergs level of total factor productivity while using current
capital and labor inputs, its predicted 2011 GDP per capita is close to 90%
of Baden-Württembergs value. Similar results apply for the other eastern
Bundesländer. In fact, Figure 7 suggests that the pattern is remarkably
uniform across the states. This straightforward exercise demonstrates the
decisive role that total factor productivity plays in explaining productivity
di¤erentials across Germany.
Using several direct and indirect measurements, Burda and Severgnini
(2015) document a slowdown in TFP growth after 1995, with subsequent
relative labor productivity improvements until 2000 deriving from increases
in capital intensity. Using regression analysis following Gri¢ th et al (2004),
they infer an inuence of rm size but not the density of headquarters, ag-
glomeration, urbanization or population density on TFP growth or levels.
They do nd a signicant inuence of the concentration of managers and
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Figure 7: Counterfactual Output
technical personnel as well as a negative inuence of the investment rate.
The latter nding supports the view that investment is a substitute for,
rather than a complement to multifactor productivity, at least in the current
context. This is consistent with the nding that in industrial sectors, East
German workers currently work with more capital per worker and their rms
exhibit lower capital productivity than Western counterparts.
While di¤erences in TFP are the central source of persistent output gaps,
low employment rates also play a role in explaining the gap in GDP per
person. Employment ratios in the new states are still much lower than those
in the West. Baden-Württembergs employment ratio stands at 55 % com-
pared with an average rate in the eastern states of 46 % and 48 % in Saxony.
Certainly, low labor force utilization has an impact on per capita GDP. To as-
sess its signicance, we construct the following counterfactual: Assume that
workers in each Bundesland have the current, state-specic, average labor
productivity, however, let us also assume that the employment ratio in each
eastern state is counterfactually equal to that of Baden-Württembergs. Fig-
ure 8 shows that by increasing employment holding productivity levels of
workers constantGDP per capita of the eastern states would increase more
or less uniformly by about 20%. It is likely that continued implementation of
labor market reforms initiated in 2003-5 will increase labor force utilization,
leading to further convergence.
It should be stressed however, that signicant regional di¤erences in GDP
exist and persist within countries; in fact, they are the rule rather than the
exception. In the United States, GDP per civilian employee in 2010 ranged
14
Figure 8: Counterfactual employment ratios
from $135,000 in the state of New York state Connecticut, and $125,000 in
Massachusetts, to $90,000 in New Hampshire and $82,000 in Maine, in a year
when the national gure was $106,926 (and Washington DC boasted a GDP
per employee of $337,000). The land area of reunied Germany is roughly
equal to the New England states plus the state of New York.
5 East Germany through the lens of Ramsey
(1928)
Economics gives us the liberty to think about adjustment paths which respect
only the resource constraints of the economy but not those of a potentially
imperfect market system. What would have been the social planners solution
to the German unication problem? The prescription of Frank Ramseys
(1928) seminal paper would be to smooth consumption over time relative to
output.10 In a closed economy, this prescription would impose early hardship
on households, when initial output per capita is far below the steady state
level, given their need to accumulate capital rapidly. For Eastern Germany,
an open economy with access to loans and transfers from a rich uncle to the
West, the problem was fundamentally di¤erent. At the same time, freedom
10See Blanchard and Fischer (1989) for a formulation of the wide-reaching implications
of Ramseys (1928) paper.
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of movement within Germany would require attention to potential external
costs of large population movements in response to wage di¤erentials. From
early on, it was clear that Eastern German residents expected a rapid rise of
consumption to levels comparable with the West (Collier and Siebert, 1991).
A Ramsey-constrained optimum is not trivial to formulate, especially if
one subscribes to the view that tastes of East and West Germans had di-
verged over the Communist era. Nonetheless it is instructive to consider
a rareed version of such a Ramsey problem prescribing optimal paths of
consumption, investment, output and labor deployment for identical repre-
sentative consumers in the presence of externalities. The key lessons of such
an exercise can be summarized verbally as follows.11 The central planner will
generally frontload investment and restructuring, if it is possible to "import"
or reallocate resources across regions. In the presence of high congestion costs
or the uptake of public goods, she would also raise consumption in the East
to a path which is close to, but generally lower than Western levels, followed
by a very slow convergence, thereby decoupling East consumption from pro-
duction. Recognizing labor mobility and associated negative externalities, it
is also generally optimal to reduce migration incentives implied by the de-
centralized market solution. Hours for those in work should be higher than
those that would obtain in a pure market solution, and would fall over time
relative to the West as consumption rises. The constrained e¢ cient solution
would imply an initial burst of migration which boosts marginal product of
labor in the East followed by a slow rise of productivity in the aftermath. In
the past twenty-ve years, how does the historical record compare with that
benchmark?
5.1 Convergence of consumption and unemployment
As the previous section showed, signicant regional productivity di¤erentials
and productivity gaps persist, despite common rule of law and institutions,
as well as enormous transfers and investment activity. Yet at the same time,
East-West disparities in consumption, well-being and unemployment rates
fell more rapidly than those in GDP per capita or wages. Table 1 shows a
convergence of consumption patterns that has occurred over the last twenty
years, in particular the percentage of households owning durable goods such
11Burda and Wyplosz (1992) and Sinn (2000) are examples of social planners problems
that take into account various external e¤ects of the transformation.
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as cars, television sets, personal computers, and dishwashers.
Table 1: Household ownership of durable consumption goods.
Most of the rise occurred in the 1990s, in the rst ten years following
unication.12 This is conrmed at the macroeconomic level in Table 2, even
though labor productivity growth slowed signicantly in the early 2000s,
which we have shown to be related to a slowdown in East German TFP
growth beginning in 1995. Thus, higher Eastern German wages were paid
for in the form of higher unemployment, and while wages rose sharply, they
did not rise beyond labor productivity, while high consumption levels were
12Note that the quality of goods is not reected in the numbers of Table 8; especially
during the early 1990s, inferior durable goods produced in the GDR were replaced by more
expensive counterparts produced in the West.
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nanced by transfers from the West.
Table 2: Macroeconomic indicators.
Labor markets have converged in a similar fashion. In 2005 unemploy-
ment in East Germany peaked at 20.6 % (versus 11 % in the West). Since
then the rate has not only come down dramatically but the regional gap has
declined as well: as of October 2016, the unemployment rate in East Germany
stands at 7.7 % which is not much higher than the Wests 5.3 %. In fact,
Figure 9 shows that unemployment rates in Thuringia, Saxony and Branden-
burg now have lower rates of unemployment than North Rhein-Westphalia,
Berlin, and Bremen. As in the case of GDP, seemingly a North-South divide
has developed, with Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg now appearing very
distinct from the rest of Germany. It is noteworthy that West German la-
bor force participation has risen signicantly since unication, reecting the
growing adoption of East German child care practices in the West.
Wages rose sharply in the early 1990s, driving up unit labor costs and
rendering many economic activities unprotable. In the aftermath of re-
structuring and new investment, unit labor costs fell as productivity rose
and wage growth slowed (Figure 10). Slow wage growth was associated
with the collapse of collective bargaining in the East, despite higher initial
union membership and coverage rates initially there. In 2013, 60% of work-
ers in the West worked under labor contracts negotiated by unions, while
the corresponding gure in the East was 47% (Bispinck and Schulten 2014)
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Figure 9: Unemployment rates, October 2016
.
Figure 10: Real Unit Labor Costs in Manufacturing
(employee costs as a fraction of value added), 1991-2015
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Figure 10: Life expectancy at birth (in years), 1956-2014.
5.2 Health, happiness and mobility
It is sometimes argued that productivity, GDP per capita and consumption
per capita are awed measures of economic performance that do not accu-
rately reect human welfare. While the critics o¤er few reliable alternatives,
it is useful to corroborate national income and product account data with
other measures of well-being. We consider three.
The rst involves health. Figure 11 shows that life expectancy at birth
in both regions increased steadily at comparable rates until the early 1970s,
after which East Germany fell sharply behind. After reunication, this gap
was closed for women by 2004; a man in Eastern Germany has seen a rel-
ative improvement in life expectancy of three years since 1990, even while
continuing to lag behind the West by one year.
A second key indicator often stressed is happiness or life satisfaction.
Surveys by the Pew Foundation indicate that life satisfaction among East
Germans since 1991 has been markedly greater than that of Russians, Poles
and Ukrainians, and that they have reached levels hardly distinguishable from
their West German counterparts. More exact attention to mean di¤erences
in responses on a ner scale continue to show a small but signicant East-
West gap, but one that is declining steadily over time (Petruynk and Pfei¤er,
2015).
A nal indicator of convergence in living standards after a quarter-century
of unication comes from household mobility. Within three years of the fall
of the wall, more than one million people migrated to the West, most of
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Figure 11: Life Satisfaction, Pew Survey
these of working age. This migration wage was driven in part by fear that
the migration option might soon be rescinded. Consistent with this view,
gross outmigration decreased dramatically after 1991, while return migration
steadily rose, as shown in Figure 12. Since then, Hunt (2006) has shown that
fewer East Germans migrated than would have been predicted by wage and
unemployment di¤erentials e¤ects on West-West German migration ows
before 1990. Dire predictions of East Germany becoming a national park
(e.g., Uhlig 2008) proved to be premature. After a loss of about two million
inhabitants, net migration from eastern German as a whole has been zero
since 2014.
6 The costs? Lessons for Korean Unication
What are the key lessons of the German unication episode for a similar
union of South and North Korea? First, Germany was able to orchestrate a
Ramsey-style increase in East German consumption to two-thirds of Western
levels in ve years, even as output in the East plummeted and unemployment
soared. Raising wages slowed emigration of those in work; given that unem-
ployed are less likely to migrate (Hunt, 2006), joblessness resulting from this
high wage strategy was the short-term price of stablizing the population of
the eastern states. The applicability of this model to Korea may be limited,
however. While sharing the same language and cultural history, North and
South Koreas separation is a quarter-century longer than Germanys was
in 1990. Besides being more populous and capital-poor than the GDR was,
North Korea is isolated from developments in technology as well as knowledge
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Figure 12: East-West German migration, 1957-2014.
of Western society and institutions, and are possibly less aware of opportu-
nities in the South. This may reduce migration pressure at the outset, which
forced Chancellor Helmut Kohl to adopt the 1:1 Ostmark-D-Mark exchange
rate in Germany at the outset. Yet it seems likely that pressure for a common
currency and comparable wage levels in Korea will grow, especially if labor
mobility is allowed.
The Ramsey program left its mark on the West German economy. Figure
13 plots the excess of output (GDP) over absorption for eastern and western
Germany (with and without Berlin) since 1991. Taken together and individ-
ually, all the new states in the East are still net transfer recipients after 25
22
years, on average receiving about 15% of own GDP annually.13
Figure 13: East-West imbalances (GDP less absorption, as
% of GDP) Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, authors
calculations
Second, the forces of economic integration which shape the steady-state
outcome are strong, but also unpredictable. The reorganization of production
in the rst ve years as well as the adoption of West German institutions led
to sharp TFP increases, which represent low-hanging fruit also available to
North Korea. The rapid increases in eastern German TFP disappeared after
about ve years, exposing productivity di¤erences between East and West
are reected in wage di¤erentials even in 2016. Barring a massive program
of transfers, mass migration pressures may increase in the medium run. Nat-
urally the greatest migration ows result from social unrest, civil war, and
outright military conict, which were conspicuously absent in the German
case. Similarly, the political unication enhanced East German access to
western and international capital, rendering FDI much easier. Because the
Republic of Korea (ROK) will not be able to nance unication alone, it will
important to provide a similar level of assurance to international investors.
Third and most important, a Ramsey-style program for North Korea will
be expensive. Raising private consumption of 16 million East Germans to
two-thirds of western levels in 1991 and to 85% by 2015, spending more than
two trillion Euros on domestic capital formation as well as installing a modern
13The poorest western German state, Schleswig-Holstein, received transfers amounting
to about 10% of own GDP in 2013.
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system of governance could not be funded from present and expected future
Eastern German output. Rather it was nanced by a signicant run-up
of all-German government debt, an increase in distortionary social security
taxes, and a draw-down of net foreign assets. North Korea is larger, with
a population roughly half of the Souths, and much poorer, with a GDP in
2014 of $1,800 per capita versus $35,700 (CIA Factbook, 2016).
Estimating the cost of Korean reunication is an inherently speculative
exercise and depends heavily on a range of assumptions. Yet such "back-of-
the-envelope" exercises can set useful boundaries on resource transfers from
the wealthy to the poorer partner during a unication episode, expressed in
present discounted value terms and as a fraction of GDP. Applied to the Ger-
man case, and dening the costs of unication as the sum of the excesses of
regional absorption over GDP, we calculate a net cumulated resource trans-
fer to Eastern Germany excluding Berlin over the years 1990-2016 of e1.88
trillion.14 Discounting by a real interest rate of 2% and the realized growth
rate of 2.5% over the period, this burden of e1.2 trillion represents 95.4% of
West Germanys GDP of 1.3t EUR in 1990.
A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that a "Mercedes-Benz"
version of unication will be costly for Korea. To x ideas, let us assume
a steady-state objective of providing North Koreas 25 million inhabitants
with two-thirds of the Souths 2015 per capita levels of private and public
consumption. This alone comes with a price tag for the rst year of $296.7
billion (21.2% of ROK GDP of $1.4 trillion).15 North Korea will contribute
signicantly to resources towards reunication in the medium to long term,
but with an initial GDP per capita of 1/20th of the ROK in 2015, it will need
to raise its physical capital stock rapidly to accomplish this aim. Rather than
formulating and solving the Ramsey policy explicitly, we consider a scenario
of funding a North Korean investment path (in % of GDP) that mirrors
the one implemented in East Germany in the twenty-ve years following
unication. We assume an employable and fully employed labor force of
12.5 million in North Korea and further assume that its TFP follows the
pattern observed in eastern Germany, rising to two-thirds of the Souths
14Net imports of the new German states including Berlin from 1991 to 2013 sum to
e1.622 trillions (e1.677t excluding Berlin); assuming a transfer of e40b for each year in
the period 2014-16 plus a conservative estimate of e100b in the year 1990 yields e1.8t.
This is not far from current estimates.
15In 2015, ROK private consumption was $681.8 billion; public consumption was $209.6
billion (World Bank). With 50 million inhabitants, this implies private and public con-
sumption per capita of $13,600 and $4,200 respectively. Providing two-thirds of this per
capita consumption to 25 million North Koreans implies (2/3)(13600+4200)x25 million =
$296,7b. in the rst year.
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level in 5 years at a rate of 5% per annum, but remaining at that relative
level for the rest of the period. South Koreas own TFP level in 2013 is
estimated using values of capital and employment (in persons) taken from
the IMFs Investment and Capital Stock Dataset (IMF, 2015) and World
Economic Outlook, respectively, and then extrapolated to 2015 assuming
exogenous technical progress of 1% annually.16 Finally, we assume that the
South Korean economy grows at a trend rate of 3.5% per annum throughout.
Under these conditions, total transfers from South Korea to North Korea
over a quarter-century post-unication sum to $3.8 trillion, or 278.6% of
2015 ROK GDP. Discounting by 2% and assuming ROK growth of 3.5% per
annum throughout, this comes to 165.3% of ROK 2015 GDP.17 Under these
rather optimistic conditions, unication in Korea will cost about twice as
much as it did in Germany.18
7 Conclusions
This paper has reviewed the evolution of the East German economy in the
turbulent quarter-century following reunication and drawn some tentative
conclusions for Korea. In the wake of unprecedented trade integration, struc-
tural change, capital inows, and outmigration, output per capita di¤eren-
tials between East and West declined over the entire period at a speed not
far from that predicted by empirical experience and the neoclassical growth
model with a su¢ ciently high capital share. Yet progress since 2002 has been
minimal, suggestive of conditional convergence to a lower steady GDP per
capita. Evidence points to persistently lower total factor productivity in the
East as the proximate cause. Despite common rule of law, near-identical
institutional frameworks and intensive investment in the eastern regions, sig-
nicant East-West productivity di¤erentials persist and the TFP gap appears
unlikely to disappear for generations to come. Yet at the same time, regional
disparities in income, well-being, unemployment rates and health are now
hardly di¤erent from those within West Germany. On this human metric,
German unication has been an unqualied success.
16A Cobb-Douglas constant returns production with a capital elasticity of 0.4 was as-
sumed. In doing so we arrive at an initial 2016 value of TFP for North Korea of 78.3% of
the ROKs value, or roughly the value Lee (2016) estimates for ROK in 1980.
17For a comparable estimates see McKibbin, et. al (2017). Their study is based on a
much more detailed general equilibrium analysis and considers the impact of accelerated
South Korean growth, fueled by FDI as well as North-South migration.
18If the North Korean consumption (private and public) is xed instead at 50% of
Southern levels and all other assumptions remain constant, the net transfer declines to
$891.6b, or 55.2% of 2015 ROK GDP in present discounted terms.
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The German success story may have limited applicability for Korea. The
systematic gap in total factor productivity in the East after 25 years raises
natural concerns that the ROK economy may not be scalable. It remains
a striking fact that, even after a quarter-century, Eastern Germany has not
recovered the economic prowess it possessed before World War II and contin-
ues to receive transfers on the order of 15% of GDP. In comparison, current
divergence of its North and South is far greater than the initial gap between
eastern and western Germany. Unless consumption in the North is stabilized
at a lower level, it will be more challenging for the South to nance the Ko-
rean reunication process. Our back-of-the-envelope calculation suggest that
Korean unication would cost roughly twice that of the German episode.
References
[1] Akerlof, G.A., Rose, A.K., Yellen, J.L., Hessenius, H. (1991): "East
Germany in from the Cold: The economic aftermath of currency union."
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 22, 1-106.
[2] Barro, Robert J. (1991): "Eastern Germanys Long Haul", The Wall
Street Journal, May 3.
[3] Barro, Robert J. and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1991): "Convergence Across
States and Regions", Brookings Papers of Economic Activity 22, 107-
182.
[4] Barro, Robert J. and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1992): "Convergence", Jour-
nal of Political Economy 100, 223-251.
[5] Barro, Robert J. and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (2004): Economic Growth
(2nd edition), MIT Press, Cambridge.
[6] Blanchard, Olivier and Stanley Fischer (1989): Lectures on Macroeco-
nomics, MIT Press, Cambridge.
[7] Burda, Michael C. and Michael Funke (1995): "East Germany: Cant
We Be More Optimistic?" Ifo-Studien 41, 327-354.
[8] Burda, Michael C. and Jennifer Hunt (2001): From Reunication to
Economic Integration: Productivity and the Labor Market in Eastern
Germany, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 32, 1-92.
[9] Burda, Michael C. and Battista Severgnini (2015): "Total Factor Pro-
ductivity Convergence in German States since Reunication: Evidence
26
and Explanations," SFB Discussion Paper 2015-054, forthcoming, Jour-
nal of Comparative Economics.
[10] Burda, Michael C. and Charles Wyplosz (1992): "Human Capital, In-
vestment and Migration in an Integrated Europe," European Economic
Review 36: 677-684.
[11] Caselli, Francesco (2005): "Accounting for cross-country income di¤er-
ences," in Aghion, P. and S. Durlauf (eds.), Handbook of Economic
Growth. Volume 1, Chapter 9 of Handbook of Economic Growth. Ams-
terdam: Elsevier B.V., 679-741.
[12] Collier, Irwin L. Jr. and Horst Siebert (1991) "Economic Integration of
Post-Wall Germany," American Economic Review 81(2): 196-201
[13] Hall, Robert E. and Charles I. Jones (1999): "Why do some countries
produce so much more output per worker than others? Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics 114, 83-116.
[14] Hunt, Jennifer (2006): Staunching Emigration from East Germany:
Age and the Determinants of Migration, Journal of the European Eco-
nomic Association 4, 1014-37.
[15] IMF (2015): "Making Public Investment More E¢ cient" IMF Sta¤ Re-
port, June 2015.
[16] Lee, Jong-Wha (2016): "The Republic of Koreas Economic Growth and
Catch-Up:Implications for the Peoples Republic of China," Asian De-
velopment Bank Institute Working Paper Series No.571, April.
[17] Keller, Wolfgang (2000): "From Socialist Showcase to Mezzogiorno?
Lessons on the Role of Technical Change from East Germanys Post-
World War II Growth Performance," Journal of Development Economics
63(2), 485-514.
[18] McKibbin, Warwick, Jong-Wha Lee, Weifeng Liu, and Cheol Jong
Song (2017): Modelling the Economic Impacts of Korean Unication,"
mimeo, February.
[19] Petrunyk, Inna and Christian Pfei¤er (2015): "Life Satisfaction in Ger-
many after Reunication: Additional Insights on the Pattern of Con-
vergence," SOEPpapers #764.
[20] Ramsey, Frank (1928): "A Mathematical Theory of Saving" Economic
Journal 38, 543-559.
27
[21] Schulten, Thorsten and Reinhard Bispinck (2014): "Wages, Collective
Bargaining and Economic Development in Germany," WSI Discussion
Paper 191, September.
[22] Severgnini, Battista (2010): Essays in Total Factor Productivity Mea-
surement. Doctoral dissertation, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin.
[23] Sinn, Gerlinde and Hans-Werner Sinn (1991): Kaltstart: Volk-
swirtschaftliche Aspekte der deutschen Vereinigung. Tübingen: J.C.B.
Mohr.
[24] Sinn, Hans-Werner (2000): "EU Enlargement, Migration, and Lessons
from German Unication," German Economic Review 1: 299-314.
[25] Sinn, Hans-Werner (2002): "Germanys Economic Unication. An As-
sessment After Ten Years, Review of International Economics 10:113-
128.
[26] Solow, Robert M. (1956): "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic
Growth", Quarterly Journal of Economics 70, 6594.
[27] Solow, Robert M. (1957): "Technical Change and the Aggregate Pro-
duction Function", Review of Economics and Statistics 39, 312320.
[28] Swan, Trevor W. (1956): "Economic Growth and Capital Accumula-
tion", Economic Record 32, 334361.
[29] Uhlig, H. (2008) "The Slow Decline of East Germany, Journal of Com-
parative Economics 36, 517-541
8 Appendix
Data sources Original source of data: http://www.vgrdl.de/VGRdL/
Federal statescodes ISO 3166-2 codes of Bundesländer: BW - Baden-
Württemberg, BY- Bayern, BE - Berlin, BB - Brandenburg, HB - Bremen,
HH - Hamburg, HE - Hessen, MV - Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, NI - Nieder-
sachsen, NW - Nordrhein-Westfalen, RP - Rheinland-Pfalz, SL - Saarland,
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